This paper revisits the nature and governance implications of the convergence phenomenon more than a decade after it gained major prominence in politics and research. It analyses the reforms undertaken in reaction to convergence, outlines their common features, and argues that a worldwide trend towards a modified common governance pattern for convergent communications markets is emerging. The major constituent components include integrated strategies, control structures and legal frameworks for the convergent communications sector; a technology-neutral functional taxonomy; a subdivision into transmission and content regulation; and a growing reliance on alternative modes of regulation such as self-and coregulation.
Introduction and Content
By the end of the 20 th century, a core piece of the regulatory regime for the communications sector as it had been taught and practiced for several decades -the technology-oriented subdivision into media and telecommunications, into mass communication and individual communication -was crumbling. Developments driven by mobile communications, the Internet and digital television challenged the traditional categorizations, analytical frameworks, separate regulatory bodies and regulatory models for telecommunications and the mass media. The technology-oriented criteria used to categorize services as broadcasting/mass media or telecommunications were defined according to a reality that suddenly no longer existed. The Internet is the prime example and a symbol of the disruption in both policy and analysis that was caused by convergence. At the same time it is only the tip of the iceberg on which the unwieldy regulatory system has become stranded. Since then, however, a lot of work has been put into damage limitation and redefining the course of communications policy. The general problem was that the industry proceeded quickly into the convergence era while policy makers and researchers remained largely stranded in the traditional separation between telecommunications and the media. Policy reforms have been proposed and carried out in an effort to overcome this problem.
This article argues that, after a period of unrest caused by convergence, a new dominant design of governance for convergent communications markets is becoming apparent. It deduces several developmental lines of this emerging pattern from a review of theoretical and empirical literature, plausibility considerations and empirical evidence of policy reforms in various industrialized countries. It states that these are the guiding principles for regulatory reforms and will constitute the major building blocks of worldwide reforms. The major 3 purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the upcoming governance pattern and to put together the main pieces expected to constitute future communications governance. The large number of issues involved does not permit in-depth discussions of individual issues. Hence, in several cases only references to relevant detailed discussions can be provided.
The paper starts with a review of the beginnings and essential features of the separate media and telecommunications policy regimes (section 2). Subsequently, it outlines the disorder and challenges produced by convergence in policy making (section 3). The analysis of reform proposals and reform steps in reaction to the convergence trend yields the essential features of the new governance regime. This new model is achieved, among other things, through an integrated communications policy (mediamatics policy) that will no longer define the sector vertically by subdividing it according to technological criteria or industrial affiliation (section 4). The conclusions also point to a possible rise in significance of communications research for an integrated mediamatics policy (section 5).
Order by Demarcation: Telecommunications Policy and Media Policy
The nationally organized communication sectors of the 20 th century were essentially characterized by more or less uniform governance models 1 that fundamentally distinguished between media policy and telecommunications policy. Telegraphy and telephony, whose commercial deployment started in the second half of the 19 th century, were categorized as the telecommunications sector. The press and the 4 broadcasting sector, which established itself commercially a few decades later, were classed under the media sector. The telecommunications and media sub-sectors used differing technologies and separate networks. Different enterprises were involved, the political competences were separate, separate regulatory agencies and legal foundations were created and the underlying regulatory models also differed from one another (see Latzer 1997: 49ff) .
Characterized by individual communication, in the telecommunication sector the commoncarrier model established itself, with the focus on the obligation to supply in the public interest. 3 In the media sector there was a broadcasting model (public trustee model) and a more market-oriented print media model. Cable TV, which subsequently pressed forward with the convergence of the fields, assumed a special position as a mixed model of broadcasting and common-carrier regulation. Depending on the communications networks used, the allocation of communications services to the prevailing governance models was technology-specific/industry-specific. The essential difference between the models lay in the regulation of content and market access (see Windahl and McQuail 1993: 211) . This is explained in part by differing regulatory objectives. However, in some instances different means were used to pursue the same objectives, such as diversity: In the formerly monopolistic broadcasting sector this was achieved through internal diversity and in the print sector through external diversity achieved by competition. These differences can be explained by another interpretation of divergent regulatory approaches, which focuses on value conflicts. Vick (2006: 58ff) argues that the divergence is the result of a 'historical accident', because the choice of regulatory models depends on the school of political thought (market liberalism or social liberalism) prevailing at the time when the medium established itself as an important force.
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The traditional broadcasting regulation was highly active with regard to spectrum scarcity and the social and cultural effects of the content conveyed, whereas in the telecommunications sector economic factors dominated as far as infrastructure supply and national security considerations were concerned. With the internationally promoted opening up of the telecommunication markets in the last third of the 20 th century, the center of interest shifted to economic reasoning concerning the transition from monopoly to competition and the associated institutionalizing of independent national regulatory agencies (NRAs) (see Héritier and Thatcher 2002) .
The uniqueness of communications policy, and at the same time the special complexity of the regulatory policy it follows, lies in the combination of economic and socio-cultural objectives it is pursuing. The economic and social implications of regulatory decisions can overlap (see Napoli 2001) . This dual economic/social character is more prevalent in the media sector, yet it also definitely played a major role in the regulation of the telecommunication sector in the 20 th century, as for example in the universal service obligations in telephony or in foreignownership restrictions regarding telecommunications companies for national security reasons.
Disorder through Convergence
As Van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003: 197) point out, convergence gave birth to the idea of communications policy as it took shape in the late 20 th century. Communications policy, understood as the sum of telecommunications and media policy, permits a better consideration of the convergence phenomenon (see Vowe 2006) .
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In the social sciences, the concept of convergence is taken as the characterization of various phenomena. 5 In communications research, the concept of convergence is employed, on the one hand, for convergence between the programming of public and commercial broadcasters in dual-order models and, on the other hand, for the blurring of the traditional demarcation between telecommunications and the mass media, which is discussed as such in this paper. It should, furthermore, be noted that in the telecommunications policy debate too, the integration of wired and wireless communications is also called convergence. Since the 1980s, convergence in the communications sector has been discussed as being unavoidable and desirable. This has taken place more intensively in telecommunications circles than in media circles, and predominantly in relation to the aspired-for integrated broadband networks and services (see Garnham and Mulgan 1991 Collins and Murroni 1996; Baldwin et al. 1996; Latzer 1997; 1998; McQuail and Siune 1998; Mueller 1999; Marsden and Verhulst 1999; Latzer et al. 1999; Murdock 2000; Hoffmann-Riehm et al. 2000; Bohlin et al. 2000; Iosifidis 2002; Van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003; Storsul and Syvertsen 2007) .
From an analytical perspective, convergence is taking place at many levels, with reciprocities within it being of particular importance (see Latzer 1997; Meier 1999; Murdock 2000) . A leading role is being played by technological convergence. However, it is inappropriate and misleading to reduce convergence to this alone, as is often done, or above and beyond that to combine it with extremely naïve expectations of an all-embracing uniform medium.
Technological convergence stands for a universal digital code, for common (IP) protocols, which are used for different technological (hybrid) platforms (fixed-wire and mobile communication, WLAN, broadcasting, WiMAX, etc.) . Convergence creates a 'digital modular construction system', which offers great flexibility for innovatively assembled services. This can lead to service-integrating devices, such as TV-capable mobile phones.
Convergence also and especially leads to increased flexibility on the supply side, and so to increasing product variety as the previously rigid combination of technology and content (services) is dissolved. Technological convergence furthers corporate convergence too, i.e. the 8 same companies are now active in both sectors and in the third sector, the Internet (keyword triple play) (see Bauer 2005) . Moreover, convergence enterprises of a new kind are emerging here, following core businesses such as search engines (e.g. Google) and electronic trading (e.g. eBay). As social-functional convergence, it is being realized that telecommunication is now also increasingly used in the private-entertainment sector and broadcasting is increasingly used for business communication (e.g. internal corporate business TV). At the same time, shifts, substitutions and combinations in the application of services are taking place. This is also called receptive convergence, since it is about the change in reception patterns, a convergence of usage patterns (see Höflich 1999; Hasebrink 2003; Wagner et al. 2004 ). Finally, a spatial convergence can be identified -which includes the globalizing effect of ever-increasing cross-border services and uniform technology -as well as a regulatory convergence, affecting the coordination and integration of regulatory systems for media and telecommunications.
The result of the convergence of telecommunications and broadcasting is more than just the sum of its parts, as the hard-to-classify online-communication sector makes clear. The conceptual and terminological formulation of the convergence trend varies according to the research perspective. Thus the result of convergence is variously called multimedia, TIME 
Disorder in Communications Policy
Convergence is causally connected to globalization as well as to liberalization. Digitalization in general and the Internet in particular are changing the cost structures in the communication sector, enabling and demanding new business models and thereby profoundly changing the competitive conditions in convergent mediamatics markets. Seen historically, the first convergence step in the direction of telematics (the digitalization of telephony) was connected to the liberalization of the telecommunications sector. The cross-border character of Internetbased services has additionally accelerated globalization and the corresponding (multi-level) governance problems.
Since the end of the 20 th century, communications policy and its scientific recording have been under increasing pressure to reform, with the central problem lying in the fact that the industry has already entered the mediamatics era while politics and scientific analysis are still operating in institutions and regulatory systems that are split between telecommunications and the mass media. The digital destabilization of the governance models originated in the extremely obsolete categories that were applied. For decades, these served as differentiating criteria between the mass media and telecommunications, and thereby also for assigning differing regulatory models: technologically oriented, vertical sector definitions, the differentiation into mass and individual communication, into public and private communication and the strict separation of sender (supplier) and receiver (customer).
These are not simply academic problems of communications theory. They do indeed produce real economic and political effects. Legal insecurity increases, planning safety decreases and the investment risk rises. In sum, the development of the sector, which is considered to be central to the information society (keyword Lisbon strategy of the EU), can be seriously hampered. The growing political arbitrariness in demarcating and categorizing new services only adds to the legal insecurity. Likewise, in order to evade regulatory conditions that might prevent their diffusion (universal service obligations, access fees, interconnection, content regulation, quota regulation, etc.), Internet telephony is not classified as telephony and
Internet TV is not classified as TV (see Dong 2006) . With broadband services, care is taken not to apply the common-carrier model with its corresponding regulatory conditions. 7 On the other hand, there is an ongoing discussion of whether, owing to their lack of regulation of broadband networks, common-carrier models are still adequate. As things stand, with tripleplay suppliers the question arises of whether their relevant market is the broadband market.
Legal insecurity also arises concerning questions of responsibility for content, whether
Internet service-providers are common carriers like telecommunications service providers, and so not responsible for content, compared to publishers of mass media, who are responsible. Consequently, the disputed question of whether the content of websites is public 11 or private leads to legal insecurity. These legal insecurities are also increasing because of spatial convergence, which is more or less discussed as globalization. The combination of mainly national regulations and trans-national services not only leads to the disputed issue of whether the regulations of the country of origin or of the receiver country are to be applied. It also raises the question of whether this leads to increased opportunities to evade national law, to the increased necessity of trans-and supra-national regulations and to increased self-and co-regulation. Altogether, from an economic point of view the legal insecurities are causing considerable transaction-cost increases. These include the cost of litigation as well as search costs for service-suppliers and consumers. There is also disorder in relation to broadcasting regulations concerning the democratic political process. Regulations governing the reporting of elections, for example, can be legally circumvented through Internet-based services.
Beside the problems of obsolete demarcations outlined above, the convergence trend means that new regulatory responsibilities are arising and of growing importance. These include the protection of intellectual property, the taxation of Internet trading and the regulation of cryptography and of domain-name systems.
Altogether, convergence has led to a political control crisis in the communications sector. The controllability of the sector through communications policy is increasingly being called into question, especially with regard to the ability to achieve medium-and long-term objectives.
This is also a result of the increasing complexity of the sector to be controlled. 8 Because, among other things, liberalization and convergence mean that the number of players and their connections, which have to be taken into account, are expanding massively (see Cherry and Bauer 2004; Verhoest 2005) .
The public regulatory objectives in the media and telecommunications sector remain the same. They are still made up of a mix of economic and social features. However, the potential to attain these objectives by means of traditional regulatory models is decreasing. It is not only obsolete regulatory demarcations that are contributing to this -so are the shorter lifecycles of technological innovation and services, changes in the industrial structure and in user behavior and the increasing number of players involved. It also has to be considered that convergence is leading to a strengthening of the characteristics of communication policy that arise from the mixture of socio-cultural and economic regulation (see Napoli 2001) . These now also increasingly have to be taken into consideration in the telecommunications sector, particularly with regard to specific decisions. for core mass-media sectors such as the press and broadcasting (ranging from competition policy and market-power control over spectrum policy, to press subsidies and youth media protection) will remain out of touch with reality if they do not take account of telecommunications and Internet developments -that is, if they do not adopt an integrative perspective of the convergent communications system of mediamatics.
Academic research and policy makers have produced reform proposals in reaction to the convergence trend and the control crisis arising from it. Through an evolutionary process, they are aiming for a changed governance regime, an integrated mediamatics policy (see Latzer 1997 Latzer , 1998 ) and the joint regulation of electronic communications (see OECD 2003).
In addition, they are developing the national specifics of the regulatory reforms (see Hoffmann-Riehm et al. 2000; Roßnagel 2005 ).
The core of the new governance approach is often vaguely referred to as regulatory convergence. As with technological convergence, it would be misleading here to imagine it as a detailed, uniform solution for all networks, services and content of the convergent mediamatics sector. A differentiated glance at reform proposals and implementing steps makes it possible to recognize the direction and essential features of the new order that a growing number of researchers and policy analysts deem necessary. As in the traditional model, a more or less internationally uniform pattern for integrated mediamatics policies can be expected to emerge.
As Storsul and Syvertsen (2007) point out for the case of European Television Policy, some regulatory differentiations persist in the convergence era. There are differences in the intensity and speed of reforms, e.g. for television compared to new services, and the forces of stability should not be underestimated. Altogether, there will be divergences regarding the features, the intensity in sub-fields (TV, telecommunications, new services), and the timing of the reforms.
The institutional reforms will and should differ in detail in the particular states, and they will have to be evaluated specifically on a country-by-country basis. This is necessary because the starting conditions, the legal framework, the constellation of interests and power relations, the extent of existing integration of telecommunications and media policy and the speed of convergence vary greatly from country to country. It thus makes a major difference whether, as in Germany, the political competences for telecommunications and broadcasting are distributed between central government (telecommunications) and the Länder / federal states (media), among various ministries, as in Austria, or are organized within one ministry, as is the case in Japan. Path dependencies of developments need special consideration, as do the positions of interest and the distribution of power related to them. In Germany, for example, this has resulted in a situation where the regulatory categorization of online services is not dealt with on an objective policy basis but is determined by political compromise between the Länder and the central government (see Roßnagel 2005) . There is thus a great deal of inertia in long-established systems, especially as every organizational change is associated with a gain or loss of power.
Despite all the differences in the details of national solutions, it is argued that some common developmental lines can be deduced from an institutional perspective, or that these common features can be derived from the analyses of recent developments in various countries. Results of scientific and policy analyses as well as the characteristics of reform steps that have already been implemented by particular nation states or trans-national players have been used for this.
Altogether, five common developmental lines can be identified, which are briefly explored below. These features are to be understood as predictions/hypotheses and not as a normative framework for the future common model of communications governance.
Integrated Strategy -Integration of Political Competences: All in Sight
In the traditional model of communications policy, the strategy development (regulatory framework) and regulatory implementation (regulators) were mostly located in one place in the particular ministry responsible. In the course of liberalization, a separation and removal of the telecommunications regulation from public administration to independent regulatory agencies took place. While only a decade ago nearly all European telecommunications regulators were part of the public administration, this is no longer the case in any EU member state. Of the OECD countries, only Japan and Korea still concentrate strategic and regulatory competence within one ministry (see OECD 2005). The political strategy development has remained the competence of the public administration or of the parliaments.
An integrated mediamatics policy duly takes into account the convergence phenomenon and consequently strives to overcome the traditional but outdated telecommunications / massmedia dichotomy in policy-making. Its objective in developing strategies is to achieve an overview of the whole communications sector, including not only the electronic (broadcasting, telecommunications, online) but also the non-electronic media communications In detail, the horizontal convergence regulators differ, as for example in their competences for the spectrum, for the print and postal sectors or for competition policy. In political practice, the relation between the sector-specific regulator and the general competition authority is organized differently. Thus, the British convergence regulator OFCOM is jointly responsible, along with the general competition authorities, for the application of competition law. In Australia, however, the general competition authority was given the sector-specific rights for the telecommunications sector. In several countries there are separate agreements with regard to the distribution of competence (see OECD 2003).
The expected advantages also vary according to the degree of integration. Effectiveness and efficiency gains can be achieved, not least through synergy effects and transaction costs savings, even when integration is restricted solely to a joint organizational umbrella.
Institutional precautionary measures such as transparency obligations can be put into place to counter the danger of a too great concentration of power in the hands of one convergence regulator. 
Technology-Neutral, Functional Taxonomy -Transmission and Content

Regulation: Don't Lump Everything Together
Having everything in sight and all under one roof does not mean that everything can be lumped together. Convergence, though, demands a new taxonomy that moves away from the previous sub-division on the basis of the technology used or the industrial group. This is because technology/networks and content/services have become disconnected as a result of convergence. 10 The new classification criteria are functional, activity oriented and technology neutral. In this regard, a sub-division into carriage regulation and content regulation is becoming apparent. As a result, a separation into economic and social/cultural regulation should also take place. A strict separation is impossible; however, as decisions in the transmission sector not only have economic but also social and cultural effects, as changes in the gatekeeper, for example, have an impact on content.
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The carriage regulation of different technological platforms in the new model is uniform, while for content regulation, depending on the expected effects, no uniform regulation is applicable. For the organizational structure of the convergence regulators this could mean that there is also an organizational sub-division between carriage and content regulation, with the joint organizational umbrella ensuring that better account is taken of interactions. Spectrum allocation and a universal-service policy would rather be assigned to carriage regulation than to content regulation.
In Britain, after years of consulting -also on the point of whether two regulators would be of advantage -OFCOM was set up as a convergence regulator that not only is responsible for carriage regulation but also for content. In the US, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has been jointly responsible for telecommunications and broadcasting since the 1930s.
However, it includes organizational units for telecommunications, broadcasting and cable TV, corresponding to the traditional division in industrial groups. Under convergence conditions, even this has been criticized as being inefficient, and reforms in the direction of a functionally oriented organizational structure are being proposed (see Garcia-Murillo and MacInnes 2001).
Integrated Legal Framework and Laws
The integrative-strategic view and the organizationally integrated convergence regulators are also increasingly leading to an integrated legal framework or to integrated laws governing telecommunications, broadcasting and online communications.
The 1996 Telecommunications Act in the US was an integrative step, previous plans for a dedicated regulatory chapter for convergent services having been abandoned. 11 Germany is an example of the situation where an integrated legal framework may be regarded as advisable from a public policy perspective, but is considered to be unachievable owing to the role of power-politics. As a result, the reforms in reaction to convergence revolve around sub-issues in Germany, without a comprehensive concept -for example, the standardization of youth protection in the media and privacy protection on various communication platforms (see Roßnagel 2005) .
Alternative Modes of Regulation: From Government to Governance
The regulation -the establishment of norms, their implementation and sanctioning -is not taking place solely by virtue of national laws and other forms of centralized state regulation.
The convergence trend is pushing the vertical and horizontal extension of classic government towards governance. Vertically extended, it is increasingly resulting in multilevel governance in the mediamatics sector. Horizontally extended, it is resulting in a reinforced integration of private actors in the regulatory process. With the growing application of self-and coregulation (alternative regulatory forms), parts of the regulatory process at least are being handed over to private actors. 12 The role of the state is changing in comparison to the traditional model. The advantages of self-and co-regulation as opposed to classic state regulation can be well utilized due to the conditions shaped by convergence, such as the cross-border characteristics of services, rapid technological change and an increased number of players. The application of alternative, in part innovative regulatory forms is increasing in all segments, especially in the Internet-based services, with the spectrum ranging from standardization to consumer protection and domain-name administration to youth protection in the media (see Latzer et al. 2002 Latzer et al. , 2006 Latzer and Saurwein 2007; Schulz and Held 2004) .
At European level, for example, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, which will replace the Television without Frontiers Directive, explicitly encourages industry self-regulation and co-regulation.
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Conclusion
More than a decade after convergence was first placed on political agendas it is still a central driving force of regulatory reforms worldwide. Policy making is still lagging behind the changes contingent on convergence in the communications sector. The traditional policy model, with its fundamental division into telecommunications and the mass media, the underlying differentiation characteristics and the regulatory models founded on them are increasingly deficient. They are obstructing the development of the sector and diminishing the fulfillment of regulatory objectives. Combined with an increase in complexity through additional players and regulatory levels, not only is the attainment of the unchanged objectives declining, but the controllability in the convergent mediamatics sector is also deteriorating. Policy making as well as science and research are reacting to the slower than expected but still advancing convergence trend.
Despite all (necessary) differences in the detail of particular national strategies, which are not least due to path dependencies and collisions of interests, this paper has derived a rough outline of the new model for an integrated mediamatics policy based on policy analyses and conceptual reasoning. There are several reasons for the new (implicit) international consensus on a new model, including efficiency considerations (economic reasoning), influential regulatory forerunners, imitation strategies and the EU's harmonizing activities.
In summary, central developmental lines of the emerging pattern can be characterized as follows. In strategy development it is becoming imperative to take a comprehensive view of the whole communications sector at the same time. The trend in control/regulatory structures is moving toward a joint organizational umbrella, although not everything should be lumped 24 together when regulating through one horizontal convergence regulator. Unlike previously, not everything is now sub-divided according to the network technology used, but according to functional, application-dependent and technology-neutral criteria in a uniform carriage regulation as well as an effect-dependent differentiated content regulation. In precisely the same way, the correspondingly altered legal foundations are tending to be integrated.
Increasingly, alternative modes of regulation (self-and co-regulation), especially regulations that are not legally set down in detail, are being applied, increasingly integrating private actors. Moreover, the rapid techno-economic change is leading to a dynamic framework in which periodic reviews are already included.
The implications of this predicted new model will be manifold. They not only transform the statehood in communications but may also affect the relationship between communications research and policy making. With convergence, not only is the economization of the convergent sector increasing, but the importance of the often overlooked interaction of social and economic implications in the mediamatics sector is also growing. Due to increasingly application-and effect-dependent regulation in the new governance model, communications research may gain momentum and growing relevance in the shaping of policy making, after having been rather neglected in this field over a long period (see Braman 2003) . Policy making not only requires detailed institutional surveys (control structures, modes of regulation and regulatory instruments) as input for an integrated mediamatics policy, but also reliable estimates of (changed) uses and effects of the whole spectrum of applications. The core competence of communications research may not only acquire increased significance for effect-dependent content regulation but also for other policy fields, such as the control of market power and the regulation of ownership-structures. Here, the results of effect-and reception-research may be of greater relevance to the new policy model (see Napoli and Gillis 25 2005) . In the choice of a technology-neutral regulation, for example, it is interesting to see how far the usage patterns have changed, and whether and how the social impact of terrestrial TV is decreasing in a convergent service sphere. In order to play a more prominent role in the range of disciplines, communications research needs to be deeply engaged in such issues.
Moreover, it needs the understanding that topical research on structures and organizations, and also the uses and effect research -which are core fields of communications researchdemand a systematic extension of the traditional subject matter. Communications research that meets its requirements as an integrative science can contribute essentially to the interdisciplinary analysis of communications policy.
Notes
1 For the purpose of this paper, the focus is on the predominant commonalities of governance regimes employed in industrialized countries worldwide. This does not deny the fact that there are several differences at a more detailed level as well. In this respect the new common model will be similar to the old one.
2 On the development of media and communications policy paradigms in the US and Europe see Van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003) .
3 There have been differences between the US and the European policy approach. In addition to common-carrier goals, the European public service model for telecommunications has also aimed at fulfilling socio-economic goals (e.g. contribution to full employment, stabilization of investment cycles).
approximation and fusion of nano-, bio-and information technologies with the cognitive sciences is discussed under the catchphrase NBIC-convergence (also 'converging technologies'). 6 For an early analysis of these developments see Nora and Minc (1978) . 7 This applies, for example, to the US, where the FCC has declared broadband to be an information service, free of common-carrier obligations.
8 Complexity theory suggests, that so-called 'complex adaptive systems' are less governable and predictable. A communications policy implication of complexity theory would be that emphasis should be placed on the adaptability of policy processes and structures which is supposed to increase the sustainability of policymaking in communications (see Cherry and Bauer 2004; Cherry 2007 ).
9 Debated risks of an integrated regulator include, for example, that one regulatory tradition (telecommunication) will dominate the other (broadcasting), 'That social and cultural goals will take a back seat to the economic imperatives of the industry being regulated.' (Vick 2006: 59) 10 Nevertheless, the vivid discussion of 'network neutrality', which can be understood as a subset of 'technology neutrality' for the Internet area, points at the interest-driven intentions of companies to 'artificially' differentiate their platforms and services. 12 Self-and co-regulatory arrangements differ in the intensity of state involvement. In the case of self-regulation, the industry regulates itself with no or only minor contributions by state actors. Co-regulation is a system of alternative regulatory arrangements which are formed on an explicit unilateral legal basis (see Latzer et al. 2002: 40) .
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13 On the national level, for example, the UK Communications Act 2003 strengthens the role of self-and co-regulation (see Vick and Doyle 2004: 40) .
